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• The debate on the privatization of enterprises in Eastern Europe often presumes that
enterprises are still controlled by an identifiable entity called "the state". This, how-
ever, is no longer the case. Since the demise of tight central planning, the nominally
state-owned enterprises are de facto steered by insiders such as incumbent managers,
workers, and local administrators. As the customary property rights of insiders are not
legally acknowledged and are thus not secure, insiders tend to adopt a myopic attitude,
and neglect the long-run profitability of their firms.
• Centrally organized privatization programs to disburse ownership rights to non-insiders
are usually advocated as the best way to improve the efficiency of the firms. However,
such privatization programs challenge the present position of managers, workers, and
local bureaucrats. The insiders therefore tend to resist the privatization programs. If the
central government cannot quickly decide the ensuing power struggle in its favor, the
establishment of secure and tradable private property rights is delayed and the perfor-
mance of the enterprises may deteriorate even further in the meantime.
• The extent to which a central government needs to take the customary property rights
of insiders into account in the design and implementation of its privatization policy
depends on its political power. Whereas the government in former Czechoslovakia had
been able to largely disregard the claims of insiders, governments such as the Polish one
have been far less successful. The evidence supports the conclusion that a weak central
state is ill posed to rapidly and successfully implement privatization strategies that dis-
regard the customary rights of insiders.
• In Russia and most other successor states of the Soviet Union, the central authorities
are in an extremely weak position relative to enterprises and local administrations. In
order to privatize quickly, Russia should largely respect and formalize the customary
property rights of insiders and make these rights tradable. Although Russia's present
privatization approach grants managers, workers, and local bureaucrats more say in the
priv- Nation process than the respective programs in Eastern Central Europe, Russia
would be well advised to enhance the preferential conditions for insiders even further
and to scale down the scope of its voucher program.
• The criticisms voiced against insider privatization are not convincing. They either refer
to general problems of the transformation process that no privatization method could
avoid, or the criticisms refer to problems that only arise if insider privatization is deemed
illegal by official policies that do not take customary property rights into account and
that do not make the property rights openly tradable.
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The privatization of existing state enterprises remains one of the most important and controversial aspects of
the transformation process in post-socialist Eastern Europe. In the economic debate, the central points of
contention are the appropriate speed of the ownership transformation, the groups of society that should be
favored or excluded as new owners, the methods of establishing effective corporate governance, and the
appropriate pricing of the assets. In the political debate, the issue is particularly sensitive. The disbursement of
ownership rights in state enterprises constitutes a major redistribution of existing assets (although the net worth
of the enterprises has often turned out to be less than expected).
Three years of fundamental economic reforms in Poland and Hungary and two years in former
Czechoslovakia (CSFR) now enable us to go beyond the initial theoretical discussion and to draw some
empirically-based conclusions for the privatization efforts of late-comers such as Russia. Whereas new private
firms have grown rapidly in Eastern Central Europe ("privatization from below"), the privatization of existing
enterprises ("privatization from above") has so far proceeded at a much slower pace than governments
intended. Problems of asset valuation, the inadequate administrative infrastructure, and the lack of markets for
risk diversification are usually quoted as major reasons for the delays. In this paper I will go one step further
and argue that one of the premier reasons for the delays in the privatization of medium-sized and large
enterprises is a struggle between the state and enterprise insiders (mostly managers and workers) over the
initial distribution of property rights. This conflict has been costly because it has postponed microeconomic
adjustment and increased the inefficiency with which firms are being managed in the meantime. A potentially
even more damaging struggle may now loom in Russia where the government has also embarked on an
ambitious program of top-down privatization.
The main conclusion of this paper is that, under conditions of an extremely weak central authority such as
in Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the best privatization strategy
is to buy off the resistance of insiders by recognizing customary property rights and officially granting insiders
substantial ownership rights in their firms. Although the Russian privatization program goes further in this
direction than other programs in post-communist Europe, Russia would be well advised to increase the
element of insider privatization even further in order to avoid a protracted struggle for control over its state
enterprises.
The paper is organized as follows: Chapter II challenges the standard presumption that an identifiable entity
called "the state" can actually exercise ownership rights over the supposedly state-owned enterprises in
Eastern Europe at present and discusses the importance of the customary property rights of insiders. Based on
a brief evaluation of the privatization experiences of Eastern Central Europe (Chapter III), the paper makes the
case for granting insiders a dominant role in the privatization process in countries such as Russia where the
central state is particularly weak (Chapter IV). The subsequent Chapter V examines Russia's present
privatization program. The major conclusions are summarized in Chapter VI. Although the discussion is
This research is part of a project on the transformation process in Eastern Europe sponsored by the Volkswagen
Foundation. Support is gratefully acknowledged. Valuable information was made available by Janusz Dabrowski and
Michal Federowicz (Gdansk Institute for Market Economics), Miklos Szanyi (Institute of World Economics of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences), and Jiri Chlwnsky and Eva Klvacova (Institute of Economics of the Academy of
Sciences of the CSFR and Ministry for the Administration of National Property and its Privatization of the Czech
Republic, respectively).mostly restricted to Russia as the most important case, the thrust of the theoretical arguments and the empirical
lessons from Eastern Central Europe can be applied to other CIS members.
II. Property Rights at the Onset of Privatization
1. The Evolution of Property Rights in Centrally-Planned Economies
The discussion on the privatization of existing enterprises in post-socialist Europe is usually based on the
presumption that the nominally state-owned firms are indeed under the control of an entity called "the state",
which can thus decide about the fate of the firms more or less as it sees fit. This presumption is misleading,
though; it appears to be based more on a textbook description of an old-fashioned Soviet-type economy than
on an analysis of the actual distribution of property rights in Eastern Europe. The following paragraphs will
argue that the property rights situation is far more diffuse and that a rational privatization strategy needs to
take the interests of those individuals into account which presently exercise de facto ownership rights.
On the most fundamental level, the problems of centrally planned economies can be traced back to the
absence of strong individual incentives to use productive resources efficiently and to convey information on
economic scarcities to other agents. In a textbook case of a Soviet-type economy, productive assets are de jure
and de facto owned by the state. The state exercises its property rights through a rigid system of top-down
central planning. Decisions are taken by party officials, state planners, and, to a lesser extent, by enterprise
managers. However, the individuals who draw up, execute and control the plan on behalf of the state neither
bear the full costs nor reap the full rewards of their decisions. The bulk of costs and returns of individual
decisions over the use of productive resources accrues to "society" (which is sometimes officially called the
owner of productive assets). "Society" being factually unable to exercise control, the property rights to
productive resources are ill-defined in such a centrally-planned economy.
1
The term "centrally-planned economies" only loosely fits the actual economic mechanism, which used to
operate in the economies of the former Council on Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) before the final
demise of socialism. The rigid Stalinist central planning system had long ago turned out to be unable to cope
with the technological shift away from large-scale heavy industry to more high-tech, small-scale production.
2
The reason was that the main task of the central planning apparatus, i.e., the allocation of resources among the
many productive activities in the economy, became more complex as the number of goods increased, quite
independently of the overall volume of production to be coordinated. Technological progress and the desire to
expand the consumer goods sectors multiplied the number of goods to be produced and thereby the need for
coordination [Nove, 1986]. The planning bureaucracies soon proved incapable of doing their job without
severe failures. Due to the inflexibility of the system, minor inconsistencies often resulted in major disruptions
of production. Roughly speaking, those managers and lower-level bureaucrats who could see what went wrong
The costs of organizing would be prohibitive for the population as a whole. Interests are too diverse and each single
decision as to how to use any particular asset is inconsequential to households. Thus, free riding would have to be
expected. Of course, the socialist state never had the intention to let the population participate in running the economy
to begin with.
Under the system of large-scale physical planning, the Soviet Union at least achieved rapid industrialization, albeit at
tremendous social costs. For Hungary, Poland and what used to be Czechoslovakia, who had already attained a sizable
degree of industrialization prior to going communist, the system proved an almost unmitigated disaster from the
beginning.neither had the power nor the incentives to do something about it, while those top-level planners and
politicians who had the power were largely kept unaware of the problems.
In response to mounting inefficiencies, the socialist economies moved away from textbook-type central
planning over the course of time. The distribution of de facto property rights in productive resources changed.
Even in countries which did not deliberately reform their economic system, the planning process ceased to
work strictly from the top down. With the growing complexity of the division of labor, the iterative aspect of
planning gained in importance: subject to the priorities spelled out by the party, the enterprises drew up plans
and passed them up the hierarchies for approval. On the way up, these proposals were collected and aggregated
until they reached a level authorized to make decisions. Planners at this level then passed down production
targets based on — but not necessarily identical with — the aggregated proposals from below. The targets
were disaggregated again on their way down the chain. Upon receiving the targets, enterprises returned
requests for inputs. This process was repeated several times. A bargaining culture developed [see, e.g., Malle,
1992].
3 But the gradual changes in the relationship between central administrators and firms did not prevent
major coordination failures. The bureaucracy continually failed to finalize current plans ahead of the period of
their implementation, and persisting inconsistencies led to many arbitrary amendments during the execution of
the respective plans.
a. Socialist Reforms in Eastern Central Europe
In some countries such as Poland and Hungary, the spontaneous changes in the mechanics of central planning
were deliberately fostered by conscious economic reforms. After the establishment of the Solidarnosc
movement, the Polish government in 1981 allowed substantial decentralizations of enterprise decision making.
Under the new system of self-management, employee councils were formally empowered with competences
on hiring and firing managers, on determining basic enterprise policies, on setting wages, and on using profits.
But the results were far from encouraging. In order to avoid conflicts with employees, the managers neglected
investment, consented to excessive wage increases, and then lobbied the bureaucracies for new credits, higher
output prices, and lower taxes. Growing macroeconomic instability ensued. The central authorities
increasingly lost control of the economy as firms learned how to play off various levels of the hierarchy
against each other and to exploit their vaguely defined and conflicting goals [Szomburg, 1991]. The result was
a "balkanization of bureaucracy" [Swaan, Lissowska, 1992a]. The disintegration of central authority was
further precipitated by its obvious lack of legitimacy following the imposition of martial law in late 1982.
Under these circumstances, managers and workers' councils de facto turned into owners of "their" firms.
Unfortunately, this did not elicit an efficiency-oriented behavior since these de facto rights were neither legally
acknowledged nor tradable.
The case of Hungary to some extent resembles that of Poland. The first attempts in Hungary at
decentralizing enterprise decision making without abandoning state ownership were introduced in the 1950s. A
more determined and encompassing effort was made in 1968 with the New Economic Mechanism [see Brus,
1986]. Although the reforms failed to replace bureaucratic forms of control with genuine market coordination,
they at least created some room for marginal legal and semilegal private activity [Kornai, 1990]. In 1985, the
introduction of enterprise councils in the majority of firms further weakened the control of central ministries.
These councils were endowed with powers similar to the Polish employee councils but came to be dominated
by management rather than workers. Enterprises became largely self-managed and enjoyed a considerable and
growing autonomy. Central planning of physical quantities largely gave way to discretionary bargaining
Nove [1986, p. 98] speaks of "orders written by the recipients".between state administrators and managers of firms on prices, subsidies, and other special conditions for
individual firms.
Unlike Poland and Hungary, Czechoslovakia^ kept its firms under tight central control, apart from a short
episode of reforms during the "Prague spring" of 1968.
5 The system of central planning by physical indicators
was maintained basically to the eve of the 1989 revolution. The first post-socialist government inherited state
enterprises, which were still used to being tightly controlled from above
6 and which had not gone through a
period of self-management or price liberalization. Thus, managers and workers could not lay claim to
significant customary property rights.
b. Customary Property Rights in the Former Soviet Union
While in Hungary and Poland the ruling elites themselves initiated substantial deliberate decentralization
"from above", no major attempts of this kind were made in the Soviet Union until the late 1980s. To the
contrary, starting in the Chruzhchev era, the growing pressure that planning failures exerted on the Soviet
economy led to a series of attempts to reshuffle responsibilities among the numerous bureaucratic hierarchies
drafting, executing, and supervising the central plan. Among other things, vertical and horizontal mergers were
ordered in an attempt to alleviate the higher authorities of some of the complexities of planning. It is worth
noting, though, that industrial ministries and enterprises themselves also found it rational to strive for the
greatest possible vertical integration in order to achieve autarchy and thus to isolate themselves from the
consequences of planning errors.
Over the course of time, the severe and worsening shortcomings of the planning system were somewhat
mitigated by a process of spontaneous "quasi-private" ordering. In their desire to control everything, Soviet
planners duplicated the major planning and supervising organs several times. Overlapping areas of competence
were also common between industrial ministries. This very deficiency of the planning process afforded a
growing amount of discretion to enterprise managers and lower-level bureaucrats. Enterprises frequently faced
conflicting orders from different bureaucracies. This put them in a position to make their own decisions as to
which orders to fulfil and to which extent. Despite the absence of major systematic reforms, a gradual
decentralization of decision making had thus been at work for decades in the former Soviet Union [Nayshul,
1991].
A "complex network of informal relationships" [Nove, 1986, p. 105] developed between enterprise
managers, bureaucrats, officials of the communist party, suppliers, and customers. The major purpose of this
network was to cope with the problem of uncertain supplies of inputs. The system was based on personal
contacts, reciprocal favors, and bargaining. As time went on, almost everything became tradable in what
Nayshul [1992] has called the administrative market. Bargaining became possible over issues such as
production targets, resource allotments, favors, rights to ignore orders, and positions in the hierarchies. In
addition, an informal barter trade in resources developed between horizontal levels of different hierarchies and
between enterprises. This horizontal bargaining again was a response to worsening bottlenecks caused by the
remoteness of upper levels of the bureaucracy from economic reality. The isolation of top-level bureaucrats
Although Czechoslovakia ceased to exist on 1 January 1993, most of the developments related to in this paper precede
the separation. I will therefore continue to use the term "Czechoslovakia" in reference to the Czech and Slovak
republics.
For an account of the brief 1968/69 reform period, which featured many of the elements also present in the Hungarian
approach, see for instance Brus [1986].
Albeit subject to qualifications similar to the ones applicable to enterprises in the Soviet Union before perestroika (see
pp. 2 ff. in this paper and Mejstrik and Hlavacek [1991]).grew with the increasing discretion that enterprises and lower-level apparatchiks achieved over the kind of
information to pass on and whether or not to comply with orders from above [Murrell, Olson, 1991]. It must be
stressed, however, that the degree of official decentralization achieved in the Soviet Union until the mid-1980s
remained a far cry from the one realized in Hungary and Poland. The Soviet planning machinery retained
enough influence to make sure that at least notional plan fulfilment remained the overriding concern of
enterprises.
During the subsequent period of perestroika (1987-1991), the authority of the center was further weakened,
especially with the 1987 law on state enterprises, which introduced forms of worker self-management
[Johnson, 1991]. While the importance of vertical relations between firm managers, officials in ministries, and
local bureaucracies seems to have declined considerably in recent years, bargaining between enterprises has
become still more important for securing access to scarce inputs [Burawoy, Hendley, 1992; Filatochev et al.,
1992].
The concept of ownership of assets involves three distinct rights: (i) the right to manage the asset, i.e., to
decide to which use it is put, (ii) the title to the profits generated from the use of the asset, and (iii) the right to
dispose of the asset, i.e., to transfer the ownership rights to third parties [Alchian, Demsetz, 1972]. When the
Soviet Union collapsed, at least the first two of these rights did not rest with central authorities in Moscow
anymore. What used to be state enterprises had either been claimed as de facto property by individuals or
divided into spheres of influence among insiders on the basis of informal, unofficial customary rights obtained
in the administrative market [Nayshul, 1992]. Customary rights of this kind can be very persistent and are
amenable only to gradual change [see also Lin, 1989; North, 1992].
The erosion of central control finally became irreversible with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in late
1991, the prohibition of the Communist Party and the liberalization of most prices in the successor states of the
Soviet Union at the beginning of 1992. Although almost all major enterprises in Russia are still nominally
owned by the state, the entity called "the state" no longer effectively exercises control over the firms that it
still nominally owns.
In such a situation, a privatization policy may appear to be obsolete. However, the replacement of
effectively enforced state ownership by customary property rights does not remove the problem of ill-defined
property rights completely. Substantial uncertainty about the actual distribution of customary rights over time
arises. The fact that recognition and enforcement of customary rights to assets and resources depend on
personal relationships greatly limits the number of possible partners for transactions.
7 Since customary rights
are often at odds with written law, a crackdown by the authorities on transactions based on customary rights
can never be ruled out. Thus, the amount of worthwhile economic activity is also limited by contractual
uncertainty.
8 Replacing customary entitlements [Wiseman, 1991] by secure private property rights officially
recognized and protected by the state should therefore be a premier task of economic reform. Even if firms are
no longer controlled by the state, a privatization policy thus at least ought to remove the uncertainty resulting
from the gap between the de facto and the de jure allocation of property rights.
To be sure, it can make sense in a developed market economy to voluntarily limit the number of possible partners for
certain transactions by sinking specific investments in order to realize advantages of specialization. However, the
gains from increased specialization must be paid for through an increase in transaction costs because specific
investments need to be protected against opportunistic action [Williamson, 1985]. Where gains from specialization are
lower than the additional contract writing and enforcement costs required to protect them, impersonal, anonymous
exchanges are superior. It is in this sense that property rights backed solely by mutual trust and interdependence can
be inefficient.
It should be noted, though, that plan inconsistencies and breakdowns of production made uncertainty as to whether a
given contract would be fulfilled a pervasive problem of central planning from the beginning. The spontaneous forms
of decentralization and vertical integration mentioned above are a response precisely to this problem.2. The Importance of Customary Property Rights for the Design of Privatization
Strategies
Privatization is the attempt to correct the central deficiency of (post-)socialist economies: the lack of
individual incentives to use resources efficiently.
9 In a textbook world, the only relevant efficiency criterion as
to whom the property rights should initially be given to is that of organizing costs: it can be left to the market
to find the best qualified owner for any asset as long as initial ownership is not too dispersed to permit
negotiations with interested buyers. This view, however, abstracts from costs which may arise from conflicts
over this initial distribution.
The effective distribution of customary property rights at the outset of the reform can be highly relevant for
choosing the appropriate policy because these rights constitute a source of income to insiders. Any privat-
ization scheme threatening the customary rights of managers, workers, and local bureaucrats must be expected
to encounter their resistance. This can impose high costs on the economy for two reasons. First, managers and
workers are not likely to actively pursue — potentially painful — adjustment policies in an enterprise if the
probability is high that they will not be able to reap the benefits from these efforts. At the same time, outsiders,
i.e., the government and/or potential outside investors, are not in a position either to implement restructuring
measures, as long as insiders dominate the firm. Consequently, if insiders obstruct privatization policies, real
adjustment will be delayed. Second, insiders will be tempted to adopt a myopic "sauve qui peut" strategy
[Winiecki, 1992] and to run down the assets of their enterprise while they still can. They can do so by cutting
back on investment outlays, piling up debts, raising wages beyond what the enterprise can bear, and by
transferring assets to newly founded firms of their own.
1
0
The extent to which a country needs to base its privatization policy on the initial distribution of customary
rights depends on how substantial the costs of a conflict with insiders are likely to be. This in turn will depend
on the political power of the state.
1
1 Whereas a strong state may well be able to disregard the claims of
insiders, a weak state is ill posed to rapidly and successfully implement privatization strategies which do not
respect the customary rights of insiders. The above analysis is substantiated by evidence from Eastern Central
Europe presented in the next chapter.
III. The Privatization Experience of Eastern Central Europe
1. Former Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia's "velvet" revolution of late 1989 meant a complete and immediate shift in political power to
new elites. Thereafter, managers who owed their jobs to the communist nomenklatura system enjoyed neither
clout in the new political establishment nor substantial support in the population. The political cost to the new
government of rapidly breaking resistance to privatization on the part of enterprise insiders should therefore
9 For a good discussion of the relevance of privatization for institutional reform, microeconomic adjustment, and
macroeconomic stabilization, see, e.g., Hinds [1990].
The significance of this latter behavior will be examined in Chapter IV.
Skaperdas [1992] offers an operationalization of the concept of power in terms of opportunity costs of non-
cooperative behavior. A powerful government would then be one who could quickly force its privatization program on
enterprises without jeopardizing its own political future. See also Poznanski [1992] for an elaboration of the
determinants of the power of governments and its relevance in the transition process.have been very low.
1
2 And indeed, what little insider resistance there was successfully overcome by the
Prague government. After two and a half years of preparation, formal ownership transformation is now
progressing smoothly and rapidly in former Czechoslovakia.
The centerpiece of Czechoslovak privatization has been the voucher system,
1
3 under which Czechoslovak
citizens can acquire shares of several thousand large enterprises at nation-wide auctions. The first of two
scheduled waves of these sales has been completed successfully in the second half of 1992.
1
4 The scheme
involved neither a preferential treatment of managers or workers in the auction process nor any up-front
concessions to induce enterprises to participate. Although Czechoslovakia allowed managers to prepare
proposals for the privatization of their enterprises, any interested outsider could hand in a proposal as well.
The final decision rested with the designated state authorities. Interestingly, 80 percent of the privatization
projects included in the first round had been proposed by managers. This indicates that even the Czechoslovak
authorities wanted to avoid conflicts with insiders for the time being to ensure at least a smooth start of the
voucher program into which the government had invested a considerable proportion of its reputation. Yet, the
authorities of Czechoslovakia (and, by now, the Czech Republic) appear to be strong enough to control the
behavior of insiders and to continue with their chosen approach.
1
5
Of course, the rapid and smooth completion of the first wave of voucher privatization does not yet imply
that the enterprises involved possess an ownership structure conducive to rapid restructuring. The final success
in terms of improving the efficiency of firms will depend on the behavior of the private investment funds,
which control the majority of shares sold in the voucher program. Nonetheless, the experience with the first
round supports the view that if enterprise insiders cannot claim substantial customary property rights, and if
the state is in a politically strong position, the economic costs of a centrally administered privatization
program allocating ownership titles without regard to the interests of enterprise insiders remain tolerable.
2. Poland
In contrast to former Czechoslovakia, enterprise insiders in Poland could claim to possess relevant customary
property rights. Although the political revolution in Poland in 1989 entailed a complete shakeup of the ruling
elites, the state still remained weak with respect to enterprises. Polish state enterprises are dominated by
employee councils, which in turn consist to a large extent of members of the Solidarity Trade Union. Since it
was Solidarity who first challenged the communist regime and who led the way to the revolution, employee
councils are finding open ears in the Sejm for their concerns. Predictably, the privatization of larger enterprises
has been sluggish in Poland even by East European standards [see, e.g., Winiecki, 1992].
The Polish mass privatization program, which has been discussed since late 1989, has so far failed to get off
the ground. Under this scheme, several hundred state enterprises in good financial condition are supposed to be
transformed into joint stock companies. Upon this transformation, employee councils are to be abolished,
1
2 This is true in particular since workers in Czechoslovakia had never been actively involved in the running of state
enterprises. They thus did not possess significant customary rights.
1
3 The Slovak government recently announced that it intends to scale down the voucher program in its second wave
scheduled to begin in mid-1993 [see FAZ, b].
The first wave included almost 1,500 enterprises. On average, a little more than 60 percent of their book value was
offered for sale against vouchers [MANPP, 1992]. The auctions were conducted in five rounds at the end of which
more than 90 percent of the shares had been placed [East European Privatization News, 1993].
15 It should also be noted that there have been few reports about active asset mining during the period leading up to the
auctions in Czechoslovakia.10
thereby transferring the control back to the state as the majority shareholder.
1
6 The shares of the firms are then
to be transferred to a number of National Wealth Management Funds, which in turn would issue shares to the
population at a later date. Although the scheme was introduced into parliament in 1991, not a single such fund
has been set up until the end of 1992.
What little privatization of existing state enterprises there has been, has occurred mostly in the so-called
liquidation path.
1
7 This method involves the formal dissolution of state enterprises. Liquidated enterprises may
be auctioned off in whole or in part, they can become part of a joint venture, or they can be leased by a private
law company to be newly established by their employees. While firms which are unable to meet their tax
liabilities can be forced into liquidation, the method can also be applied to other enterprises upon initiative of
or subject to consent of the employees. The dominant role insiders are playing in the Polish privatization is
well documented by the fact that they have ended up as owners or lessees in more than 80 percent of the
voluntary liquidations [see Rzeczpospolita, 1992].
More importantly though, the Polish example also highlights the detrimental effects on enterprise
performance of a protracted struggle for control. Survey results [see Dabrowski et al., 1992] suggest that the
profitability of Polish firms has deteriorated during the privatization process. One reason is the excessive
duration of the transformation procedure.
1
8 This hurts the economy because adjustment efforts are typically
suspended during the period of bargaining over methodological questions. The lack of outsiders capable of and
interested in formulating an adjustment strategy coincides with the uncertainty of the employees over their
future property rights. Consequently, the firm is kept in a protracted state of limbo in which even the initial
capital may be consumed. Commercialized Polish firms, i.e., those transformed into private-law companies
owned by the state, adopted a wait-and-see strategy. Early efforts at technological and organizational
adaptation were clearly less pronounced in these firms than in those under voluntary liquidation. In cases
where commercialization was not followed by an immediate sale of the shares to private investors, even the





The starting conditions in Hungary exhibit parallels to the case of Poland. State enterprises have long escaped
the rigors of physical central planning and enjoyed substantial discretion under self-management. Privatization
of state enterprises started in a spontaneous way in 1989 and early 1990. Enterprises took advantage of the
opportunity to set up new firms and to enter joint venture agreements. The new firm or the foreign partner then
As an inducement to participate, the program offers employees the opportunity to buy up to 20 percent of the shares at
favorable conditions [Ministry of Ownership Changes, 1991].
1
7 By mid-1992, a little more than 1,700 out of roughly 8,500 Polish state enterprises had in one way or another entered
the process of ownership transformation. Out of these, about 1,250 employed the liquidation path. All in all, 385 firms
had completed their privatization, almost 350 of which in the liquidation path. The pace at which new privatizations
were initiated decreased markedly in the first half of 1992 [Rzeczpospolita, 1992].
1
8 To some extent, the dramatic fall in profitability merely reflects the general downturn in the Polish economy in 1990
and 1991. The switch from central planning to market coordination initially destroyed the human capital invested in
operating within the old system [Schmieding, 1992]. Inevitably, it will take some time to accumulate the — different
— human capital necessary to take full advantage of the superior opportunities of the new coordination mechanism.
In terms of adjustment efforts, sales of firms to foreign investors seem to have been the single most successful cases
[Dabrowski et al., 1992]. While in these cases insiders are basically giving up their property rights, they are being
compensated by improved job security through the infusion of new capital, technological and marketing know-how,
and better access to Western markets.11
took over orders, assets, and employees of the state enterprise on favorable terms, often leaving the old
enterprise behind as an empty shell. These activities must be viewed as attempts by insiders to secure their
positions in a changing economic and political environment. Like in Poland, spontaneous privatization
activities in Hungary met with severe criticism on grounds of fairness and justice [Crane, 1991; Gruszecki,
Winiecki, 1991]. The government responded to these criticisms in early 1990 by founding the State Property
Agency. This institution was given ownership rights over the 20 percent of Hungarian enterprises which until
then had still been under direct state control. Furthermore the agency assumed the task of supervising all
privatization deals, including those involving self-managed firms and small establishments in the service and
retail trade sectors. The state thus tried to reassert its control over the privatization process; all privatizations
now needed the approval of the agency.
Apart from a largely unsuccessful attempt to privatize 20 apparently promising companies by initial public
offerings, the State Property Agency allows both enterprises and outside investors to initiate transformations,
but retains the right to decide on the initiative and the method to be employed. The property rights acquired de
facto by employees in the framework of the New Economic Mechanism
2
0 are being largely recognized by the
provisions that the agency's decision on the privatization procedure is not binding for self-managed
enterprises, that the founding organ and the employees have to be consulted on outside initiatives, and that
employees of self-managed firms are entitled to 20 percent of the revenues generated by the privatization of
their enterprise [Ministry of Finance, 1990].
Even this rather mild form of a reinforced state control over the privatization process turned out to be
counterproductive. Due to complaints about the disappointing speed of the ownership transformation, a self-
privatization program for small and medium-sized firms was introduced in the fall of 1991 [East European
Privatization News, 1992]. This program allows small and medium-sized enterprises to perform their own
privatization without direct government involvement. The only difference to the earlier forms of spontaneous
privatization is that firms must work with a government-licensed private consulting firm. The government
retains the right to withdraw the licenses of consultants if it does not think it is getting a fair deal. Also,
insiders do not necessarily end up as owners under this program. Nonetheless, the program assigns a crucial
role to the old managerial elite.
2
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Politically, it has been comparatively easy for Hungary's post-socialist authorities to grant managers a
strong say in the privatization of their firms. Whereas Polish politics had been highly divisive since the
imposition of martial law in late 1981, the incumbent political and managerial elite had been far less
discredited and had even gained some grudging respect under Hungary's rather relaxed variant of socialism.
After the demise of the socialist government, enterprise insiders have been strong enough to preserve far-
reaching competences as to the privatization of their firms from the days of self-management,
2
2 while the
government has been strong enough to secure sizable revenues for itself. Privatization has been proceeding
more quickly than in Poland. By mid-1992, roughly 15 percent of Hungary's state-owned enterprises but only
5 percent of their Polish counterparts had been privatized (excluding small privatization; for details, see
2
0 For details on the New Economic Mechanism, see, e.g., Brus [1986].
Note also that the self-privatization program is an attempt to build on spontaneous activities (spontaneous
privatizations and the sprouting of consulting companies). In this sense it can be seen as an instance of the
government's legalizing natural or customary law, i.e., as an example of precisely the kind of legislative activity
compatible with the process of spontaneous ordering [see von Hayek, 1973].
2
2 By mid-1992, more than 370 transformation proposals for enterprises had been accepted by the agency. Almost 330 of
these had originated either from enterprises or from investors, while only in 44 cases (albeit concerning very large
firms) did the initiative come directly from the state (information provided by the Institute of World Economics of the
Hungarian Academy of Sciences).12
Heinrich [1992]). This indicates that conflicts between government and enterprises have been less of a
problem in Hungary, which has gone further than Poland in respecting the customary property rights of
managers.
IV. The Case for Insider Privatization
The experience of Eastern Central Europe supports the proposition that large-scale, centrally organized mass
privatization programs require a strong state [see also Poznanski, 1992]. Since they challenge the sources of
rents of incumbent managers, workers, and bureaucrats, these kinds of programs usually face powerful
resistance. Major output losses due to a long and unproductive struggle for control can be avoided only if the
insiders can quickly be replaced by other effective owners, i.e., before they find the time to consume valuable




In Russia and most other successor states of the Soviet Union, the central state is in an extremely weak
position relative to the state-owned enterprises. Enterprise managers, bureaucrats in industrial ministries, and
to some extent workers have acquired a substantial say in how "their" firms should be run and where profits, if
any, should go. The major enforcement instrument of the old order, the communist party, no longer exists.
Large parts of the central planning bureaucracy have been dismantled over the course of the reforms and
would thus be unavailable for the task of supervising enterprises, should the state attempt to reestablish central
control. But the major problem lies in the struggle between government and parliament [see also Hare et al.,
1992]. Political reforms in Russia took place in several steps and are still far from complete. Both chambers of
the Russian parliament are still remnants of communist times, and so is the constitution. As a result, enterprise
insiders, who belong to the old nomenklatura, can use parliament as a platform for lobbying their interests.
The startling rise of the industrial lobby in Russia in the second half of 1992, culminating in the replacement
of acting Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar by the industrial manager Viktor Chernomyrdyn, testifies to the
political clout of enterprise managers. The problem is compounded by the struggle between central and local
authorities, which is far more pronounced than in the much smaller countries of Eastern Central Europe.
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4 The
authority of the center does not reach far enough to quickly enforce decisions opposed by regional and local
bureaucracies and enterprises. This is why we would expect privatization programs that ignore the customary
property rights of managers, workers, and bureaucrats associated with enterprises to run into problems of both
enforcement and efficiency.
The crucial point is that attempts to reestablish central control, i.e., to expropriate the individuals who
"own" the firms at the onset of the privatization program [Nayshul, 1992], are likely to provoke a struggle for
control. In contrast to, for example, Czechoslovakia, the central authorities of Russia are so weak that this
struggle would be very protracted and disruptive. In addition, the regional barter system, which is founded on
personal relationships between the former lower-level nomenklatura, might break down in the process,
depriving the economy of one of the few coordination mechanisms which are still working and which spare
In the latter case, the state temporarily assumes the responsibilities of the owner after having stripped the incumbent
nomenklatura of their customary rights.
The overview of the legal basis of Russian privatization in Radygin and Krasnoselsky [1992] nicely illustrates this
point in its effort to distinguish painstakingly between parliamentary laws, presidential decrees, decrees ratified by
parliament, instructions issued by the Committee on Federal Property, programs adopted by the city of Moscow and
so on.Bibliothek
ias Insfituts fur Weltwirtscba
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Russia an even greater collapse in output. The obvious conclusion is that, in order to privatize its nominally
state-owned enterprises quickly, Russia should respect and formalize the customary rights of insiders. In short:
Russia should opt for insider privatization.
By insider privatization we will understand the transfer of ownership titles to, or their acquisition by, those
groups of individuals who, prior to the reform, had been holding de facto rights to managing the enterprise, to
disposing of (parts of) its profits, and sometimes even to transferring assets to other firms. These insiders can
be managers, workers, and members of the old planning bureaucracy.
2
5 Generally speaking, insider
privatization can take two very different forms. On the one hand, insider privatization can occur spontaneously
— and often illegally — as the unintended by-product of attempts by still-socialist governments to
decentralize the planning process or to allow complementary private activity outside the state sector [Kornai,
1990]. On the other hand, the state may adopt a privatization strategy that deliberately allocates a major
proportion of de jure property rights to the insiders.
Spontaneous insider privatizations have occurred in Hungary and Poland in the last days of the old and the
first days of the new regime. They have also been going on in Russia since 1990 [Filatochev, 1991; Johnson,
1991; Burawoy, Hendley, 1992; Hendley, 1992]. Examples of these unofficial privatizations include the
opportunity for state enterprises to enter into cooperation agreements with foreign partners, to contract out
some of their work to domestic private firms, or to allow workers to perform extra contractual work for the
enterprise in their after-hours. These new opportunities were exploited by insiders who were motivated by the
desire to secure their customary rights for the future and to exploit new sources of rents which happened to
open up during the transformation process. In this way, privatization started from voluntary private initiative,
even before it became official government policy.
The usual procedure is for the state-owned enterprise (SOE) to conclude an agreement with an outside
partner (who frequently but not always is identical in person with the individual(s) running the state firm) on
terms that are highly favorable to the latter. In Hungary, several cases made the headlines where managers had
agreed to sell their state enterprises to foreign investors (sometimes of dubious reputation) for what were
believed to be absurdly low prices. In return, these managers had been guaranteed a seat on the board of the
new private firm that was thereby established. In a similar vein, some managers founded their own private
companies and then transferred — against a token payment — to it the bulk of the movable assets of the state
enterprise they were heading. The employees also moved on to the new firm, and the state enterprise was left
behind as an empty shell with nothing but its debts remaining on its books. Winiecki [1992] reports similar
cases from Poland. He relates instances where managers, apparatchiks, or their relatives founded a private
company in order to obtain supply contracts from the state enterprise to which the insider was associated. The
private company fulfilled these contracts by employing equipment and workers of the "parent" firm, often for
a token fee. The prices charged to the state enterprise, however, were reportedly outrageously high. Although
those are extreme examples, it is not too surprising that these kinds of activities provoked popular outrage in
Hungary and Poland, resulting in an attempted crackdown by the central authorities. The Hungarian State
Property Agency is the visible result of this backlash.
Given the potential for political controversies over insider privatization, we carefully need to consider the
reasons that are advocated against this privatization method before we further advocate insider privatization as
the most promising avenue for Russia. Eight major reasons are advanced for the rejection of insider
privatization in general, and of its spontaneous, unofficial variant in particular:
As has been shown above, the extent of these rights varies considerably between countries.14
(1) It is argued that the new private enterprises founded by way of spontaneous insider privatization tend to
be even less efficient than the SOEs they emerged from [Winiecki, 1992].
The reason advanced for this argument is that new firms created by members of the old nomenklatura just
add the profit maximizing interest of their owners to the soft budget constraints of the old SOEs. The parent
SOE grants to the private firm access to scarce resources on extremely favorable terms. Thus, the private firm
does not allocate its inputs efficiently, and may not even be forced to minimize costs in order to be very
profitable. The problem is compounded by the fact that the private firm often inherits from the state-owned
parent a monopoly position in the market for its output.
The proposition can be based on two strands of arguments. On the one hand, the owners of the private firm,
who usually are also the managers of the parent SOE, may be able to appropriate a larger share of profits
and/or to pay higher wages than they could in the state-owned firm. This would give them the incentive to
transfer profits to a nominally private firm while leaving costs for the state-owned parent to bear. Of course,
this in itself does not increase the inefficiency with which production is carried out. However, the argument
runs, the fact that they can appropriate a larger share of any income they may be able to generate for
themselves will induce insiders to exploit the soft budget constraints of the parent enterprise even more
recklessly than before. On the other hand, an increase in inefficiency could be explained by arguing that
insiders may not be able to choose on efficiency grounds the assets which they want to employ in the new
private firm. Rather, the choice of factor combination and scale of operation in the new firm may depend on
which assets the particular insiders feel they can safely use without incurring the risk of intervention by the
state or by other insiders in case there are conflicting groups within the same state enterprise. Thus, the new
private spin-off might operate either on a more inefficient scale or with a more inefficient factor combination
than the parent enterprise did.
The above arguments are not without merit in principle. A first-best sequencing would indeed require soft
budget constraints to be hardened before state enterprises were granted the liberties they are enjoying de facto
today. However, as central control has already lapsed in Russia, this has become a mute point. Of course,
budget constraints for all Russian enterprises should be hardened as soon and as much as possible. First-best
efficiency would also mandate an open bidding process to allocate ownership rights. However, with the
Russian state as weak as it is, this option is not open at present either.
Most importantly though, inefficient choices of scale or factor combination, where they have occurred,
resulted from the unofficial and often technically illegal nature of spontaneous privatizations. Insiders were
constrained in their choices by a lack of secure property rights. The appropriate response to the above critique
of spontaneous forms of insider privatization is thus not to reject insider privatization altogether, but to make
insiders the primary beneficiaries of official privatization policy as well.
Apart from this, even the danger of spontaneous forms of insider privatization generally leading to worse
performance is not as serious as it might seem. First, the effect of an increased tendency to exploit soft
constraints might be countered by an increased tendency to respond to market signals in order to maximize
profits. Second, the argument that spontaneous insider privatization leads to inefficient scales or factor
combinations needs to be modified to the effect that it may lead to different but not necessarily worse scales
and factor combinations. The gross inefficiencies prevailing in state-owned enterprises to begin with make it
just as likely as not that the new way of production will be more rather than less efficient.
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2° Winiecki [1992] acknowledges that the efficiency problem is presumably not very serious. He maintains his criticism
of spontaneous privatization on the grounds that it "gave a bad name" to privatization in general, thereby causing the
delays observed in the Polish privatization process. The point is valid to the extent that spontaneous privatizations
were carried out by managers over the heads of workers. Interpreted this way, Winiecki's argument is consistent with15
(2) Insider privatization is viewed as not conducive to hardening the enterprises' budget constraints
because of leaving the old personal networks intact.
However, the announcement that customary property rights will be largely recognized will contribute to
bringing them out into the open, removing the secrecy with which the old elites traded in the administrative
market. By opening up this market for outsiders, personal relationships will eventually lose in importance. The
nomenklatura networks will give way to normal, more impersonal market relations. Indeed, the state could




(3) Insider privatization is derogated as unfairly favoring the nomenklatura, i.e., the elites of the old regime.
These old elites are seen as either retaining their dominant positions in the aftermath of the reforms or as
enriching themselves [Blanchard, Layard, 1992], while popular sentiment has it that instead they should be
held responsible for the crisis the countries are locked up in [see Filatochev et al., 1992].
The first part of this argument criticizes the initial distribution of physical assets, while the second questions
the resulting distribution of wealth. As to the former, the available evidence suggests that it is very difficult,
even by inventing centrally-controlled privatization programs, to prevent members of the old nomenklatura
from retaking strong positions in the emerging market economies [see also Hare et al., 1992]. It has turned out
to be the rule rather than the exception in the transforming countries of Eastern Central Europe for enterprise
representatives to retain substantial initiative and veto rights in the transformation process (see Chapter III). As
for the criticism that insider privatization leads to an undesirable distribution of wealth, the weight of the
argument again depends on the available alternatives. If it is true that insiders are in a position to delay
ownership transfers to other groups, and if the uncertainty ensuing from this conflict induces them to consume
part of the enterprise capital in the meantime rather than using it productively, society will be worse off under
alternative scenarios.
(4) Privatizing state enterprises is thought to have positive external effects for creating an environment that
encourages further private investment [Roland, Verdier, 1992]
28 thus warranting active state involvement to
speed up the process rather than just leaving everything to spontaneous forces.
This consideration, however, strengthens rather than weakens the case for insider privatization in countries
with a weak central government. Acknowledging the customary rights of insiders makes it easier to legally
define and enforce property rights. If the central government is not sufficiently strong to overcome the
resistance of insiders within a very short time, attempts to impose other privatization methods are likely to be
largely futile, counterproductive, and time consuming. As has been pointed out above (Chapter III), the
experiences of Eastern Central Europe corroborate this hypothesis.
Of course, the privatization of existing medium-sized and large enterprises by whichever method does not
suffice to create favorable conditions for a surge in private investment activity. In order to overcome potential
externality problems, it is at least as important to push small scale privatization. The experience from Eastern
Central Europe since 1990
2
9 and the first experiences of success of major Russian cities since mid-1992
(notably Nizhny Novogorod, Moscow, and St. Petersburg) demonstrate that selling small retail and service
our proposition that it is the relevant insiders, i.e., in the Polish case the workers, who resist any kind of privatization
which ignores their customary rights.
I owe this point to Holger Schmieding. The problem would remain whether both parties to this agreement could
credibly commit to sticking with it.
2
8 These positive externalities could consist of better access to inputs and resources, better monitoring through relative
performance evaluation, better diffusion of nonrival inputs, and lower costs of finding suitable partners for
transactions in thicker markets.
2
9 An overview of Polish small privatization can be found in Tamowicz et al. [1992].16
businesses does not usually encounter the problems faced by privatizations of larger firms. The main reason is
that privatization to the incumbent management or the employees does appear to be everybody's favored
approach to small privatization. The scope for conflict is thus limited. Where there is conflict in individual
cases, the stakes are not very high. There is neither much physical capital to be wasted, nor do the insiders
have sufficient clout to either shape the drafting or influence the execution of official policy. Given the low
priority of small-scale businesses in the socialist system, these insiders usually had been low on the hierarchy
of the old regime. Thus, fairness considerations do not either stand in the way of giving small enterprises to
their employees.
(5) Insider privatization is viewed as depriving the state, and society at large, of vital sources of revenue
because either the privatization agreement does not foresee any payments to the state budget or the price
which insiders are to pay is deemed too low.
This argument is considered especially important since the new governments frequently have to cope with
macroeconomic instability fuelled by out-of-control budget deficits. With the tax system inadequate and tax
collection unreliable, privatization revenues and/or revenues from profits of state enterprises are seen as
crucial to the credibility of stabilization efforts [McKinnon, 1992]. However, the idea that the privatization of
state enterprises could be a cure for state budget problems is an illusion. First and most obviously, any give-
away scheme irrespective of the identity of the recipients will not create revenues. Second, in Czechoslovakia
and Poland revenues have been insignificant, and the German privatization agency is piling up deficits. The
only formerly socialist country which achieved anything close to sizable net revenues from privatization is
Hungary. These revenues originate to around 80 percent from foreign investments [VWD-Osteuropa, a;
Denton, 1992]. However, they would have to reach three times the amount actually forecast for 1992 in order
to cover the projected budget deficit [VWD-Osteuropa, b; FAZ, a]. Therefore, privatization revenues can in no
way be a substitute for tax reform, least of all in countries such as Russia which are not very attractive for
foreign capital for the time being.
It is worth noting in this context that the future and, thus, the value of many medium-sized and large
industrial enterprises in post-communist countries do not appear to be bright anyway. As the central planners
had pushed these countries into overindustrialization, their industrial sectors are bound to shrink, notably in
heavy industry. Furthermore, many oversized firms are likely to make way for smaller competitors. Many
plants will require technological renewal, which changes them beyond recognition, because products produced
with the present equipment are not competitive at the new relative prices (especially energy has become much
more expensive). All in all, old state enterprises in the emerging market economies are unlikely to do better
than new upstarts in an established market economy, which also have a high rate of failure: in the USA for
instance, some 40 percent of new firms do not survive their first five years [Murrell, 1992b].
A peculiarity of Russia is that the central government at this point does not seem to be technically capable
of securing most of the profit and income tax revenue due to it from still state-owned enterprises [DIW et al.,
1992]. So not even on this count would insider privatization hurt the Russian budget very much. Put
differently, the current shortfall of fiscal revenue from state enterprises indicates how customary property
rights are actually distributed. In this sense, it is a consequence of the ongoing process of decentralization if
not of de facto privatization.
(6) Insider privatization is also considered as inefficient because it allows those managers to hang on to
their positions who had been selected under the communist regime not for their professional skills but for their
political reliability [Pelikan, 1992; Frydman, Rapaczynski, 1992]. These managers are considered a liability
for the new regime both because of alleged incompetence and because of potential leanings toward returning
to the socialist system.17
While managerial skills are certainly wanting in the old nomenklatura, they are also scarce among the rest
of the population, and perhaps even more so. The people in charge of enterprises today are often individuals
who actively pursued the chances opened up for them during the reforms of the old regime [Filatochev et al.,
1992; Nayshul, 1992]. Under the Polish voluntary liquidation program and in Hungary, many incumbent
managers are actively seeking cooperation with foreign partners and successful domestic entrepreneurs in
order to compensate for their inexperience in a market environment.
3
0 The bottom line is that once their
property rights are secure, insiders have incentives to improve the management of their assets. Should they not
be capable of doing so themselves, owners can always trade their property rights or share them with more
competent outsiders. It is important to realize that this possibility is available only if customary property rights
are recognized. Indeed, the more these rights are being recognized officially, the more widely and more
efficiently can they be traded. By contrast, if the state sets out to challenge their property rights, insiders have
incentives to block privatization initiatives from outside.
(7) Insider privatization is believed to preserve the existing monopolistic structures and thus to prevent a
new private sector from emerging.
It would undeniably be desirable to break up huge conglomerates for the sake of competition. Again,
however, a weak state will be ill-suited to accomplish this feat against the opposition of powerful interests.
Fortunately, first steps at splitting up Russian state enterprises de facto are occurring in a voluntary and
spontaneous way [Burawoy, Hendley, 1992; Grigoriev, 1991; Filatochev, 1991; Malle, 1992] anyway. In 1988,
it became legal for enterprises to have worker cooperatives within their departments. These cooperatives
perform work for the enterprise on a contractual basis. They are a vehicle to withhold profits from the state.
But they also introduce new market-like exchange relations into the enterprises. In-house competition for
resources and for membership in profitable cooperatives is springing up. In addition, cooperatives take on the
task of attracting business from outside and of marketing output. This departmentalization thus gradually
erodes the self-sufficiency of Russian state enterprises, opens them up for new supply relations and increases
their sensitivity to demand. Of course, introducing competition from the world market can be another way of
mitigating the monopoly problem.
3
1
(8) Insider privatization is said to lead to Yugoslav-style employee-owned firms, which are prone to grant
excessive wages and neglect investment.
This problem may indeed be serious if ownership rights of employees are not transferable as was the case in
former Yugoslavia. The problem largely vanishes if the property rights are transferable so that the holders of
these rights have an incentive to care for the long-run expected profitability of the firm, which is reflected in
the market price of theses shares.
In Eastern Central Europe, there have indeed been reports of tendencies for insiders to organize former state
enterprises in the form of closed joint stock companies [see Dabrowski et al., 1992; Lloyd, 1992]. The ensuing
variants of worker management without transferability of shares to outsiders can be viable for small
partnership-type firms only. In larger enterprises, moral hazard problems and inefficient capital intensity are
known to arise [see, e.g., Alchian, Demsetz, 1972; Williamson, 1985]. The former problem is due to a lack of
performance monitoring, the latter to the incentive to maximize the sum of wages and profits per worker. In
addition, the allocation of risk tends to be inefficient. It is therefore important for the state to insist on open
transferability of shares to be included in any company statute.
3
0 For Poland, see Dabrowski et al. [1992].
At this point, the interdependence of microeconomic adjustment and macroeconomic stabilization becomes obvious:
macroeconomic instability is fuelled by relying on the inflation tax to finance subsidies to unreformed state
enterprises. In turn, macroeconomic imbalance causes the ruble to be grossly undervalued in real terms. And this
undervaluation again insulates Russian state industry from the adjustment pressure of world market competition.18
To sum up, the criticisms voiced against insider privatization are not convincing. The arguments are either
related to insider privatizations forced into illegality by official policies that ignore customary rights, or to
more general problems of the transition which no other privatization method could avoid given the
circumstances, or they are less important than the problems which insider privatization serves to overcome.
While some unofficial and illegal insider privatizations can indeed be dubious on grounds of economic
efficiency (and certainly on legal and moral grounds), the arguments are not applicable to official insider
privatizations. One qualification needs to be made though: the legal property rights which insiders acquire
should be tradable; company statutes prohibiting the trading of shares to outsiders should not find the support
of the state.
V. Lessons for Russia's Privatization Strategy
In early 1992, the Russian government drafted a detailed privatization program spelling out categories of state
enterprises according to the priority with which they were to be privatized. The plan included a timetable
differentiated by regions and specifying the percentage of state firms to be transformed in 1992. Revenue
targets were also laid down [Delowoj Mir, 1992]. Later on, policymakers decided that the Russian
transformation from plan to market should be made irreversible by privatizing thousands of state enterprises
with the help of vouchers. Most of the firms with more than 1,000 employees or 50 million rubles book value
are to be included. Roughly speaking, Russia's present approach to privatization combines elements of the
voucher approach along the lines of the Czechoslovak example with elements of insider privatization.
The distribution of vouchers for a nominal fee began in October 1992. Like in former Czechoslovakia, the
relevant laws call for the mandatory commercialization of several thousand state and municipal enterprises to
be included in this scheme. These enterprises are to be transformed into open joint stock companies. The
shares of these companies will be owned initially by the All-Russian Property Fund and its regional
subsidiaries. In order to work out the details of the privatization procedures, a State Committee on Property
has been created. Unlike their Czechoslovak counterparts, Russian vouchers are bearer securities, i.e., they are
tradable for cash. A secondary market is developing.
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The Russian privatization program allows firms to choose from a number of alternatives. The first
alternative grants managers and workers access to up to 51 percent of shares for vouchers or for cash at a fa-
vorable price, usually 1.7 times the book value of the respective share in the firm's capital as calculated in
January 1992. There are two other alternatives. Under the first, employees and retirees get nonvoting shares in
the amount of up to 25 percent of the enterprise's capital free of charge. They can acquire up to another 10
percent of the capital in the form of voting shares, either for cash at a 30 percent discount on the face value or
for vouchers at face value. Managers can buy up to 5 percent of the shares at face value. Under the second
alternative, employees get up to 20 percent of the voting shares at face value, with another 20 percent going
free of charge to a group of managers and workers willing to take on the restructuring of the company [see
3
2 Opinions on the eventual equilibrium price of the vouchers vary wildly. Anatoli Chubais, the head of the Federal
Property Committee, claims that their nominal value will be substantially higher than their face value of 10,000 rubles
because this face value had been calculated from the book values of firms at the end of 1991. Others, however, are far
less optimistic [see Radygin, Krasnoselsky, 1992]. In recent months, 4,000 and 7,000 rubles were the prices quoted for
vouchers in newspaper reports. Of course, if Russian inflation continues at monthly rates of 20 to 55 percent, the
nominal price for vouchers may easily surpass 10,000 rubles even if the real value of the vouchers declines.19
Delowoj Mir, 1992]. The rest of the shares goes to open auctions.
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3 Overall, a maximum of 80 percent of the
share capital in federal enterprises can be bought with vouchers. In municipal and regional enterprises the
figure is 35-45 percent [Radygin, Krasnoselsky, 1992]. The Russian privatization program demands that the
open transferability of shares should be incorporated in the statutes of all companies included in the program.
Like many other post-socialist privatization schemes, the Russian variant of voucher privatization scheme is
supposed to achieve three goals:
— political: to make the reforms irreversible and to forge support for the government;
— social: to create a broad class of new owners and to let the population at large share in an equitable
way in the property which had originally been financed from its savings;
— economic: to improve the efficiency with which the enterprises are being run and to facilitate the
reallocation of assets.
The strong reliance on vouchers is seen as a major instrument to accomplish these goals. However, whether
the Russian mass privatization scheme in general and its voucher element in particular can actually serve these
purposes remains open to serious doubts.
As to the political goal, the voucher approach will strengthen the government's popularity only if it is
successful in the sense of giving to the population truly valuable assets. Unfortunately, this may not be the
case. There have been reports of local and regional authorities teaming up with managers to keep the profitable
firms out of the program [Lloyd, 1992; Ziesemer, 1992]. Should a large number of firms that are included in
the program, and with them investment funds, prove unprofitable, popular support might quickly turn into
dangerous disappointment. Neither will the scheme necessarily make ownership changes irreversible. Precisely
because it is investing a lot of its remaining prestige in the voucher scheme, the government may prefer to bail




As to the social goal, the initial distribution of vouchers will not determine the eventual structure of
ownership of productive assets [Schmieding, 1991]. The scheme is unlikely to turn the population into
entrepreneurs overnight. Many citizens will probably cash in on their vouchers as soon as possible.
3
5 And
those people who actually participate in share auctions will not end up with portfolios of roughly equal value
because the values of individual assets are likely to change considerably in the immediate aftermath of
privatization.
As to the economic goal of voucher privatization, an improvement of the performance of enterprises can be
expected from a change in ownership only if it leads to a more unambiguous definition and more stringent
enforcement of property rights than before and if the new owners are more able and willing to impose
profitability as the firm's dominant goal.
3
6 It is still too early to see whether the Czechoslovak system does
According to a preliminary report, 5,600 of the 6,000 firms to be included initially in the privatization program
complied with the obligation to state their preference for one of the different privatization methods by 1 November
1992. Roughly half of the firms opted for the first variant [The Economist, b].
This is what happened in the early 1980s in Chile where the extra liquidity that was deemed necessary for
privatization was provided not by vouchers but by government-subsidized credit [see Nankani, 1988; Agarwal,
Nurinenkamp, 1992].
Due to individual differences in attitudes toward risk, it would be inefficient to force citizens into becoming
entrepreneurs. Thus, it is the goal of egalitarian distribution of productive assets that is to be criticized rather than a
method which fails to achieve it. Indeed, their convertibility into cash is one of the advantages of the Russian
vouchers over their Czechoslovak namesakes.
For an exposition of goal multiplicity as the source of inefficiency in publicly owned enterprises, see Hartley and
Parker [1991].20
accomplish this change. Czechoslovak firms have come to be dominated by investment funds which might
choose to behave like their counterparts in developed market economies: to passively manage portfolios rather
than to actively restructure firms, and to free ride on attempts at takeovers.
3
7 Also, some of the largest funds in
former Czechoslovakia have been set up by state-owned financial institutions. As a consequence, enterprises
"privatized" to these funds have not really left the state sector. It will therefore take time before firms find
active owners and market-oriented restructuring actually begins. But all this assumes that the Russian voucher
scheme will work as smoothly as the Czechoslovak variant did. This, however, is by no means guaranteed. To
the contrary, the weakness of the Russian central authorities relative to their enterprises gives insiders the
chance to obstruct the implementation of the program in an attempt to appropriate more rents than the state is
willing to grant them.
Russia's strong emphasis on the voucher element of privatization can even impair the chances for a
successful implementation of the privatization program. Unlike some other forms of privatization, notably a
partial sale of ownership rights to active external investors, voucher privatization does not augment the capital
base of the firm. Enterprise insiders have more reason to object to a distribution of property rights to the local
population via vouchers than to a partial sale to external investors which enhances the capital base as well as
the potential profitability of the firm and which often happens on terms that have been influenced by the
respective firms. The comparatively satisfactory performance of such privatizations involving outside investors
in Poland and the preference of Czechoslovak managers for this privatization method corroborate this
hypothesis [see Dabrowski et al., 1992; Heinrich, 1992].
The Russian privatization program attempts to defuse the potential resistance of managers, workers, and
local bureaucrats in two major ways: (1) The privatization proceeds that will accrue to the public purse under
the program are largely allocated to local and regional authorities. According to the draft of the privatization
program for 1993, local and regional authorities will often get 100 percent of these proceeds, with the central
government claiming 35 percent of the proceeds only in the case of some supposedly strategic industries such
as the defence and energy industries. (2) The privatization program allows for more insider participation than
is the case, for example, in Czechoslovakia.
But, given the fact that the program asks enterprises to hand over the rights to a minimum of 49 percent of
assets and future profits
3
8 to outsiders, considerable resistance must still be expected. To be sure, insiders do
get something in return: the official recognition and protection of their property rights by the state. However, it
remains open to serious doubt whether this support by the weak Russian central state is worth this high a price
for the insiders. The equilibrium price of government protection might be closer to the 35 percent of the cash
revenues from share auctions which the central government claimed for itself in the few pilot cases of mass
privatization in late 1992 (this is equivalent to 7 percent of the overall share capital in the case of enterprises to
be disbursed to 80 percent for vouchers). Whereas a limited degree of voucher privatization may be easily
acceptable to the enterprise insiders as a device to promote popular acceptance of an insider-dominated
privatization method, the heavy emphasis of Russia's present privatization program on vouchers may well go
For an overview of the role of institutional investors in market economies, see, e.g., The Economist [a]. The problem
of a passive attitude of large institutional investors is addressed, e.g., in Committee on the Financial Aspects of
Corporate Governance [1992]. For conditions under which the free rider problem may be a serious problem in Eastern
Europe, see Frydman and Rapaczynski [1991a].
3
8 Insiders may participate in open auctions to acquire additional shares of their own enterprise, but in this case they are
being forced to pay the same price as everybody else for something which they consider their property anyway. The
only way to rationalize limits on the preferential allocation of shares to insiders would be to interpret the issue of
shares to outsiders as a payment for popular acceptance of privatization.21
to far. In its present form, Russian mass privatization still runs the risk of aggravating the current economic
crisis without reaching the political and social goals in the end.
Of course, all arguments about the effective resistance of insiders against Russia's privatization approach
are speculative in nature. However, one should bear in mind that the stakes in Russian privatization are
particularly high. Having abandoned the initial (and ill-executed) quest for macroeconomic stabilization in
mid-1992 under the pressure of the emerging industrial lobby [DIW et al., 1992], Russia's reformers have
invested most of their remaining prestige and political clout into the privatization program. Given the
economic and political importance of a smooth implementation of a mass privatization program in Russia, it
thus appears prudent for the central government to minimize the hazard of insider resistance by increasing the
element of insider privatization at the expense of the economically dubious element of voucher privatization.
Seen from this angle, there appears to be too little rather than too much insider involvement in the Russian
privatization process to date.
3
9
All in all, in order to promote a rapid growth of the private sector in Russia, the central government should
thus proceed as follows:
— It should concentrate its efforts on creating favorable conditions for the development of new private
activity [Murrell, 1992a; Schmieding, 1991; see also Ickes, Ryterman, 1992] by removing barriers to
market entry. To this effect, land and office space should be made available for private business. In
order to improve the mobility of capital between firms and sectors [Hinds, 1990], bankruptcy
legislation should be completed and enforced.
4
0 Rational capital allocation should be supported by
reforming the banking sector [Schmieding, Buch, 1992].
— As far as the privatization of existing enterprises is concerned, the focus should be on small
privatization.
— In the voucher program, the preferential access to insiders should be expanded while the importance of
vouchers should be scaled down. For this purpose, the Russian central government need not revoke its
present privatization approach. Russia's local and regional authorities are largely de jure (and even
more so de facto) in charge of the implementation of the privatization policy anyway. It would suffice
for the central authorities to grant the regional and local authorities the right to deviate substantially
from the centrally fixed limits on the preferential conditions for insiders at their own initiative. Even if
the voucher element in the mass privatization program is reduced, the vouchers, which have already
been issued, could still be useful if a sufficient number of small businesses, land, and flats were to be
sold for vouchers.
— Other than that, privatization agreements reached jointly by the groups who hold the customary
property rights in an enterprise (managers, workers, local bureaucrats, possibly even lenders and
suppliers) should be legally recognized and protected, even if the central laws should be silent on the
privatization methods employed. Indeed, there is no reason why different regions and even individual
3
9 For Poland, Sachs [1992] now concedes that insider privatization has been used too little and that the crackdown on
spontaneous privatization was an overreaction.
4
0 Of course, this legislation will also meet with resistance from industrial lobbies. But the obstacle may be easier to
overcome because bankruptcy does not pose a universal threat to the property rights of all enterprise insiders
simultaneously (there will be some enterprises who welcome the chance to collect some of their overdue receivables).
For the current state of Russian bankruptcy legislation, see Radygin and Krasnoselsky [1992].22
enterprises should not try different approaches. Those approaches which prove successful could then be




Privatization from below is making good progress in Eastern Central Europe, particularly in Hungary and
Poland [Grabowski, Kulawczuk, 1992]. The same is true for small privatization where capital requirements
and internal control problems are few. Small firms, who tend to be rather close to their market and relatively
flexible in their organizational structure, can therefore adapt rather easily to changing environments.
4
2 The
privatization of large state enterprises is proving much more difficult. Differences in initial conditions are
reflected in different strategies and speeds of privatization.
4
3
Unofficial insider privatizations have been opposed in Poland and Hungary for both fairness and efficiency
reasons. However, the alternative methods introduced in these countries do not generally perform better in the
domain of social and political justice as defined by opponents of this spontaneous kind of privatization. The
most successful official privatization methods in Hungary and Poland are those reserving a substantial say for
insiders, particularly buy-o,ut method. The fact that Hungary has been able to privatize much more quickly
than Poland is attributable inter alia to Poland's attempt to preserve many of its best performing companies so
that they could be included in the mass privatization program which has been caught up in political infighting
over the distribution of property rights. In the meantime, adjustment efforts in the companies have ground
almost to a halt, and managers and workers have been busy appropriating (parts of) the companies' wealth.
Unofficial spontaneous insider privatizations are currently going on in Russia. These are both a result and a
cause of the continuing disintegration of the old order. The privatization program of the central government
attempts to reduce the influence of insiders, it claims to speed up the transformation process, and it intends to
create a broad class of capital owners. In light of the experience from Eastern Central Europe these hopes may
well be frustrated, mainly because the Russian central authorities lack the political strength and bureaucratic
muscle to quickly decide in their favor the ensuing struggle with the powerful local nomenklatura and
enterprise managers. Still worse, this conflict may greatly increase the uncertainty faced by insiders and
potential outside investors. The result would be more myopic behavior of insiders, less efforts at adjusting to
new economic conditions, and a further decline of economic performance.
Although Russia's official privatization program gives local bureaucrats as well as managers and workers a
greater say in the privatization process than the programs of Eastern Central Europe, it would be prudent for
Russia to enhance the role for insiders even further. Officially recognizing customary property rights would
make these rights more openly tradable and would minimize the scope for conflict. This approach does not
require a strong, well-organized state. It thus economizes on one of the scarcest resources in Russia today
[Nayshul, 1992].
4
4 A considerable dose of official insider privatization appears to be the best available method
to make sure that productive assets get into the hands of the best qualified owners quickly.
4 Hendley [1992] reports how managers and workers of a large state enterprise transform their company on their own,
relying on Western blueprints to fill gaps in the existing Russian legislation on corporate statutes.
42 For the role of cognitive constraints, routines and learning in the adjustment of existing organizations to external
shocks, see Murrell [1992a] and Swaan and Lissowska [1992b].
Frydman and Rapaczynski [1991a] explain how bounded rationality leads to path-dependent behavior in the transition.
4
4 A similar point is made in Frydman and Rapaczynski [1991b].23
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